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Debt relief is a form of aid, and one that is becoming increasingly important for poor
developing countries. From the perspective of donors, funds allocated to debt relief are
attributed to the aid budget. From the perspective of developing countries, debt relief
reduces debt-servicing costs. As with aid, it represents an increase in funds available to
government. Furthermore, as with aid, eligibility for debt relief is conditional on
implementing specified economic policy reforms. The literature on aid conditionality
should therefore be informative regarding the appropriate form of conditionality for
debt relief. Furthermore, debt relief is intended to have a poverty-reducing effect.
However, relief in itself will not affect poverty. The way in which the government funds
that are freed through relief are used can reduce poverty. In other words, and this is the
argument of the paper, it is the funds associated with debt relief that can reduce poverty
(if allocated to pro-poor expenditures). The flaw in current debt relief conditionality is
that the conditions relate to policies (that should be pro-poor) rather than to the use of
these funds, which are only released after the conditions have been met. We argue that
pro-poor expenditures can and should be disbursed independently of, and if necessary
prior to, full compliance with policy conditions.
The economic study of the effectiveness of aid is like a very large jigsaw. Theory gives
us insights into how the pieces fit together, and cross-country studies provide a vague
outline of what the picture looks like. However, each country is different, both in the
nature of the economic interactions that determine the effects of aid and, at least as
importantly, in terms of the underlying policy process. Policy clearly influences
economic performance, and thus mediates the effectiveness of aid, but there is a debate
regarding the mechanism by which policy influences effectiveness (contrast Burnside
and Dollar 2000, with Hansen and Tarp 2001). A separate issue, on which current
understanding is limited, is whether and how aid influences policy, the aspiration behind
conditionality. World Bank (1998) seems to take the view that conditionality does not
work, and it is certainly true that tight conditionality is not an effective instrument to get
governments to do something they do not want to do (White and Morrissey 1997).
However, this may be going too far. For example, many African countries have
implemented significant economic policy reforms over the past 20 years, and aid has
clearly played an important role, both encouraging and supporting reform.
This paper addresses the latter issue—in what ways can aid, in the form of debt relief,
influence policy reform. Being the policy that is now foremost among donor objectives,
the focus is on poverty-reduction. Donors have established the adoption of poverty-
reduction policies, as represented through a country’s poverty reduction strategy paper
(PRSP), as a criterion for aid and, more specifically, debt relief under the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) Initiative. The question addressed here is whether this
has increased the policy leverage of aid as an instrument of poverty reduction and are
there lessons for the design of conditionality associated with HIPC debt relief? We
adopt a political economy approach, being concerned with the interface of politics and
economics—the political factors that influence the economic policy process rather than
political systems per se.
It is useful to distinguish pro-poor policies from pro-poor expenditures. First, we
consider how liberal economic policy reforms, those associated with structural
adjustment and stabilization, can be made pro-poor. Our concern is not with the detail of
reform areas, such as trade or exchange rate policy, but with the broad implications. The2
desirability of some liberalization is accepted, the question is how to protect the
relatively poor (those who either are poor, or in danger of being pushed into poverty).
This leads to an emphasis on complementary policies that, in an environment of
liberalization, make the reform process pro-poor. Second, we elaborate the notion of
compensatory policies in respect to the policy reform conditions associated with debt
relief under HIPC. Such compensatory policies comprise pro-poor expenditures that
target and protect the poor and vulnerable.
In general, it is easier (but by no means easy) to identify and implement pro-poor
expenditures than it is to implement complementary policies that make a reform process
pro-poor, especially if the reform process is relatively complex and wide ranging.
Macroeconomic, liberal, policy reform is a pre-condition for eligibility for debt relief
under HIPC. There is considerable debate, however, regarding the effect of such
reforms on the poor, and thus on the appropriate pro-poor complementary policies. The
design and implementation of pro-poor policies is demanding of policy-makers, whose
potential is conditioned by the policy environment—the political and administrative
constraints to policy. The design and implementation of pro-poor expenditures is
somewhat easier. A central argument of this paper is that given the policy environment,
the objective of poverty reduction can be more effectively promoted through pro-poor
expenditures than by requiring pro-poor policies. Less ‘up front’ conditionality should
attach to the broad economic reforms and more emphasis should be given to the
composition of expenditures.1
Section 2 considers the role of external influences, channelled through aid and debt
relief, in the policy process—how policy preferences combine with the political
capacity of a government to adopt policy and create a commitment to reforms that can
be implemented. Section 3 considers debates on the impact of economic reform on the
poor, discusses the policy context of debt relief under HIPC, and identifies the features
of the policy environment for poverty reduction. The relationship between economic
policy, aid and poverty-reduction is an issue of increasing research activity and policy
interest, although current knowledge is limited. Section 4 concludes with some
implications for HIPC conditionality and how aid can be targeted on poverty reduction
via support for PRSP processes and pro-poor expenditures.
2 Aid and external influence on the policy process
This section presents a framework for analysing the nature of the policy process in a
country with a view to identifying the appropriate ways in which external agencies, in
this context aid donors, can influence the process so as to promote pro-poor policies.
Some comments on terminology are in order. Government refers to the set of ruling
politicians who are policy-makers (and may include senior civil servants and advisors).
This paper is not concerned with the political process by which policy-makers are
selected. Administration refers to the civil service and other institutions that implement
policy. We wish to draw a clear distinction between policy-making—the choice, design
and advocacy of policy—and implementation (acknowledging that implementation
1 A longer version of this paper is available as Morrissey (2001) in which the arguments are illustrated
with examples from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.3
experience should feed back to policy-making).2 Policy-making will depend on the way
in which government functions, the strength of opposition, and the quality of
technocrats involved in the process (the same individuals may also be involved in
administration, but that is a distinct function). This is our principal concern. We
recognize the importance of implementation capability, especially insofar as limitations
constrain policy choice, but are not concerned with issues relating to administrative or
institutional reform.
It will be helpful to locate this paper within the emerging literature on the politics of
pro-poor policy, although that is peripheral to our main concern. Much of this literature
starts from the premise of ‘assuming that governments are willing to pursue pro-poor
policy’ and concentrates on three issues (Johnson and Start 2001: 9). First, how to
identify activities and target beneficiaries. Second, how to ensure communication and
satisfaction of needs and priorities for such activities within the public sector. Third, the
politics of the interface between public sector providers and beneficiaries (such as
devolving accountability, promoting local democracy and involving civil society).
Johnson and Start (2001) review this literature in some detail. Although we comment on
the first issue (as central to the identification of pro-poor expenditures), the concern here
is with the premise. What role do external influences, in particular donors, play in
encouraging governments to adopt and implement pro-poor strategies?
Morrissey (1999) proposes a framework for analysing the factors influencing
governments’ choices of which policies to adopt, and the presentation here builds on
this. The government has to have a preference for the particular policy or reform (as
elaborated below, this is distinct from the notions of ‘commitment’ and ‘ownership’ that
are prevalent in the literature). Preferences in this context are policy-specific. A
government may wish to retain the status quo or may perceive the need for change. If
the latter, there is a preference for reform (with a particular aim), but this does not imply
that the government knows what the most appropriate policies are to achieve the reform
(this is where external influences come into play).3 Aid, in itself and as a manifestation
of donor views on what are appropriate policies, can play a role in shaping preferences.
There is no reason why aid, or donors, should have an immediate effect. It takes time to
shift preferences, although is easier when there is a policy vacuum to fill (and when
governments are receptive). While the aid financing acts as a carrot, effort should be
made to convince recipients that the policies proposed are indeed appropriate (made
easier if, in fact, they are—a point returned to in Section 3).
To a large extent preferences are shaped by internal factors. At one extreme, ideological
regimes will tend to have relatively fixed and inflexible preferences, although these can
change over time. At the other extreme, liberal technocratic regimes will be inclined to
search for the most appropriate policy and tailor it to internal political needs (their
2 This is not to deny that implementation is integral to the policy process, but allows the focus to be on
policy-making. Grindle and Thomas (1991) provide the seminal discussion of policy-making and
implementation in developing countries.
3 There are two issues here. First, donor and recipient preferences regarding reform may differ; this is
the standard case of conditionality failure (White and Morrissey, 1997). Nevertheless, donors can
influence preferences (Morrissey and Nelson [2001] discuss how institutions such as the WTO can
influence policy-makers beliefs and thus shape preferences for reform). Second, having chosen a
specific policy, recipients may lack full information on design and implementation. This is where
donors can play a directly constructive role, assuming there are shared preferences.4
technocratic nature implies an ability to do this). Most governments are somewhere in
between: they have a set of preferences, but these can be altered or refined in the face of
a changing internal or external environment. Our focus is on the influence of the
external environment and external actors; internal politics is, in effect, treated as a
constraint (this is not to claim that change may not arise internally). That is, we take
internal factors as shaping initial preferences and then consider how external influences
can alter these. We begin by elaborating these factors.
A core concept is that of ‘political capacity’—the ability of the political system to
institute policy evolution and policy change. This will depend on the nature of decision-
making within the government itself, and the relative strength of constituencies that
support or oppose the direction of policy. Morrissey (1999) considers four types of
political regime in the context of how this shapes willingness to adopt new policies.
Two are mentioned here. Established regimes tend to have vested interests they will
want to protect; this combined with hysteresis renders them less willing to change
preferences and adopt new policies. New regimes may find that they have power before
they have formed policies and may be encouraged to become reformist.
The political difficulty with pro-poor reforms is that they require redistribution. On the
one hand, this implies that there will be opposition to reform (from the rich, who are
initially the powerful). On the other, there is the possibility that redistribution will, at
least in the short run, slow the rate of growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) develop a
dynamic endogenous growth model with production as a function of capital, labour and
production services offered by governments and financed by a capital tax. The capital
tax captures the re-distributive policies of government. Growth is a result of investment
in capital and therefore investment and growth are lower the higher the tax rate on
capital. Thus, redistribution ‘is conducive to the adoption of growth-retarding policies’
(Alesina and Rodrik 1994: 465). This would be of concern to governments as growth is
often the most important determinant of the sustainability of policy reform. More can be
attempted and support is greater during a period of growth, whereas reforms that are
perceived as reducing growth increase opposition. ‘Popularly elected governments
realize that political survival depends upon good economic performance’ (Sandbrook
1996: 6).
Much of the discussion of policy reform in developing countries has been concerned
with the concepts of ‘ownership’ and/or ‘commitment’ (e.g. Killick 1995;
Sandbrook 1996; Leandro et al. 1999; Dijkstra and Van Donge 2001), with ownership
seen as necessary if policies are to be implemented successfully and sustained. The
implication that ownership is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for effective
reform may be too strong. Typically, the concept of ownership is not clearly defined and
is used in a loose sense, frequently indistinguishable from commitment. Sandbrook, for
example, argues that ‘ownership’, which is not defined, is necessary for commitment,
apparently defined as requiring that ‘the executive authority must be [cohesive and]
firmly convinced of the necessity of [reform]’ (Sandbrook 1996: 5). Leandro et al.
(1999: 288) acknowledge that no clear and unambiguous definition of ownership
appears in the literature, and consider it some combination of commitment and capacity
to ‘conceive, negotiate and implement reforms’. Thus, if a government supports a
particular policy, has chosen that policy itself (although it is never fully clear how it was
chosen), and openly expresses its commitment to the policy, then it is claimed to own
the policy. This may be an acceptable definition of ownership, but it is unlikely to be a
necessary condition for effective reform. The focus here is on commitment as the5
necessary condition, rather than ownership. In other words, we are not concerned with
where the policy originated,4 but simply with whether the government accepts (chooses)
the policy.
Commitment, defined as the explicit adoption of a specific policy, can be seen as
comprising two elements—preferences and political capacity. Preferences for reform
are a sufficient condition to ensure an attempt at implementation (irrespective of
ownership), but do not guarantee successful implementation, nor do they guarantee that
the government will make its intentions public.5 Preferences and capacity give rise to
commitment to reform, but the ability to implement successfully will then depend on
administrative capability and institutional structures. In this sense, we define
commitment as revealed preference. If a government favours a particular reform and
believes it has the political capacity to advocate and try to implement the reform, it is
willing to declare the commitment. If a government has a preference for reform but
capacity is weak, it may choose not to declare its commitment (it will be implicitly, but
not explicitly, adopted). If there is no preference for the reform, there is no commitment
by this definition (irrespective of what the government may declare).6
While preferences and capacity are necessary and sufficient for commitment, this does
not imply ownership—the government could simply choose to implement a set of
policies ‘off the shelf’ (from, for example, donors). A meaningful concept of ownership,
as suggested above, would require that the policy originates with the government. This
requires considerable policy-making and policy analysis capacity, often beyond that
available to most developing countries (at least in respect of complex issues where
policy knowledge is not well known, such as poverty reduction). This is a strict
definition of ownership, and neither necessary to ensure that reform is attempted nor
that it is successful. Although ownership as defined is desirable in its own right, it is not
at all evident that ownership rather than simply commitment is necessary to ensure that
reform programmes will be advocated, implemented and sustained.
The discussion above is summarized in Table 1 which also indicates the various stages
at which external influences can come into play. If policy-making within government is
relatively open and based on dialogue there is scope for developing new policies and the
government will be receptive to external influences. External influences are often most
important in shaping preferences. Donors can encourage governments to give particular
issues more priority on the policy agenda, or try to convince governments that there is
‘new’ policy knowledge and experience that they should recognize. Disseminating
‘good’ policy experiences is one of the most effective ways to influence preferences. If
a government is presented with evidence of policies that have worked elsewhere, they
4 I am grateful to David Booth for suggesting this wording.
5 As should be clear from the context, preferences here do not mean that the government ‘likes’ the
policy (although it may do). Preferences relate to policy choice, based on information given
objectives.
6 It should be admitted that political commitment is difficult to define in an operational way. Ideally,
one needs to know the true intentions of the government rather than relying on revealed preferences
(which may be opportunistic and politically, rather than policy, motivated). A government may
declare an intention to reform simply to receive aid, and then renege on this ‘commitment’ (the source
of aid conditionality ineffectiveness). In practice, stated policy preferences are the best available
indicator of commitment.6
are more likely to be convinced that the policy is appropriate for them (i.e. external
agencies can influence beliefs over the efficacy of policy alternatives).
Donors can also support political capacity—providing evidence to counter opposition
and assistance in policy advocacy, for example. When political capacity is weak but
governments accept the desirability of reform, external agencies can be ‘blamed’ for
requiring governments to adopt unpopular policies. If responsibility for the adverse
effects of the reform is not attributed to the government, but to external actors, then
opposition has less to attack (Frey and Eichenberger 1994). More generally, the
government may support the objectives, but may have limited capacity to advocate an
appropriate policy and mobilize support for it. The type of evidence that influences
government preferences is essentially the same as that which supports policy advocacy,
although dissemination modes differ. The former should be designed to appeal to
policy-makers (accentuate the positive) whereas the latter should appeal to the public
and interest groups (e.g. deflecting or countering opposition arguments). In these ways,
donors can fill the gap where preferences are pro-reform but capacity is weak. This
implies working with or even for government.
Table 1
External influences on the policy reform process
Political dimension Donor influences
A. Preferences The government is in favour of the reform
· Placing specific concerns high on the agenda
· Policy advice and knowledge transfer
· Evidence of how policy has worked elsewhere
B. Capacity Ability to advocate policy and move to implement
· Taking responsibility for unpopular policies
· Providing evidence to build support
· Assistance for policy advocacy
· Poverty monitoring and analysis*
C. Commitment Preference revealed because capacity is adequate
· Financial support for adopting policies
· Building policy-making capability
· Technical assistance on policy design and analysis
D. Administration Process of implementing the policy
· Technical support and assistance
Note: Basic structure taken from Morrissey (1999: Table 4.1). The aim is to identify the ‘entry routes’ of
external influences on the politics of policy reform. A definition of the political dimension is
provided in italics.
* These contribute to policy-making and therefore enhance capacity, but are also elements in
implementing effective policy, therefore contribute to administrative capability.7
Once commitment exists, external agencies can help to strengthen it, directly with
financial support (to offset costs of implementation) or more generally with advice and
help in policy design. Commitment implies the government has advocated the policy
and is moving to implementation. External assistance at this stage should be directed on
appropriate policy design, such as resolving problems of targeting in pro-poor
expenditures. Some see such technical assistance as contributing to ownership (e.g.
Leandro et al. 1999). This is true in a dynamic sense, if support for capacity now
contributes to enhanced policy-making capacity in the future. However, technical
assistance for implementing specific reforms should not be considered as promoting
ownership of that reform—it is too late. Similarly, such assistance does not establish
commitment, rather it assists the process of acting on commitment.
Increasing administrative capability is an essential part of effective policy reform,
relevant not only to implementation but also to political capacity itself. ‘However
difficult and politically risky it is to decide to introduce a reformist initiative, the
process of implementing and sustaining that decision is likely to be even more fraught
with difficulty and risk’ (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 121). The problem in many African
countries is that bureaucrats were ‘captured’ by the elite. ‘Political patrons secure
positions in the civil service and parastatals for clients, who then owe loyalty to those
patrons rather than their hierarchical superiors. These transorganizational factions
advance the interests of their members—often to the detriment of the public they are
supposed to serve’ (Sandbrook 1996: 8). This captures the inherent interaction of
administrative capability and political capacity. A more capable and independent
bureaucracy can contribute to effective policy-making as it strengthens capacity (and
promotes ownership), whereas weak capabilities undermine implementation and
political capacity. Donors can contribute via technical assistance in administration and
implementation.
3 Elements of a poverty-reduction strategy
This section places pro-poor policies within the framework developed above. First, we
consider how liberal economic policy reforms, those associated with structural
adjustment and stabilization, can be made pro-poor. Our concern is not with the detail of
reform areas, such as trade policy, but with the broad implications for protecting the
relatively poor. This requires complementary policies that ensure a pro-poor effect and
compensatory policies that minimize or offset adverse effects on the poor (these include
pro-poor expenditures). We elaborate the notion of compensatory policies in respect to
the policy reform conditions associated with debt relief under HIPC. This allows us to
identify some problems with HIPC conditionality as practised and to identify pro-poor
expenditures. This is then related to the discussion of the previous section to identify the
policy environment for poverty reduction. Given the policy environment prevailing in a
country, what types of pro-poor policies and expenditures should be promoted?
3.1 The impact of economic policy reform on the poor
Kanbur (2001) provides a seminal discussion of the current state of debate on the effects
of economic policy reform on poverty (or, more accurately, on the poor). He identifies
three areas of disagreement over whether or not ‘liberal’ economic policies are pro-8
poor—aggregation, time horizon and market structure. The source of disagreement due
to aggregation is explained clearly by an example. Economic measures of poverty
mostly focus on what is happening to national headcount poverty (the percentage of
households or individuals living below some poverty line). Those who work at the
grassroots tend to invoke personal experience of what is happening to particular
households (in, for example, a study village or region). It is therefore not unusual for the
first group to argue that poverty (overall) is declining whereas the second group
counters that, in their experience, poverty has increased. Both may be right, as they are
talking at different levels of aggregation. It may even be the case that the percentage of
the poor in poverty may decline while the absolute number increases (given population
growth).
Economists (and those who could be said to adopt the ‘economists view’) tend to think
in terms of the effect of economic policy over a medium time horizon (say 5-10 years).
That is, they are concerned with what is likely to be the outcome when the economy has
adjusted to the economic policy reform. This is not to say that economists ignore
adjustment costs and the fact that some will suffer (on the contrary, many emphasize the
need for social safety nets and the role of compensatory policies), rather that they look
beyond these costs. Others, again especially those at the grassroots, are concerned
precisely with those among the relatively poor who are suffering the costs of
adjustment. To such people, ‘short-run survival trumps medium-run benefits every time,
if the family is actually on the edge of survival’ (Kanbur 2001: 1089). Thus, the
proponents of liberalization argue that reform is necessary for economic growth and this
offers the opportunity for future poverty reduction, accepting adjustment costs as a ‘no
gain without pain’ sacrifice. The critics of liberalization counter that they see the pain,
but where’s the gain? As with aggregation disagreements, there is truth in both sides of
the argument. The common ground is that both sides recognize the need for policies to
protect the poor from the costs of adjustment (although they may disagree on the detail).
The greatest disagreement is over perceptions of the underlying distribution of
economic and political power. While most economists recognize the problems of
imperfect competition and the need for regulating the behaviour of monopolistic firms,
economists tend to base their arguments on an assumption of competitive markets. In
other words, competitive efficiency is the analytic norm, and excessive market power is
a distortion or exception. Critics, and the ‘anti-globalization’ protesters are an example
of this, are more likely to see concentrated market power as the norm, and inequality in
the distribution of power as increasing. Competitive markets are an academic concept at
variance with what is observed in the real world. This disagreement is important and
intense, and an important area for future work. For example, there is increasing
recognition of the need to address the behaviour of multinationals in the context of
multilateral (WTO) trade liberalization (e.g. Morrissey 2002). However, this is beyond
the scope of the current analysis.
These sources of disagreement have important implications for the design of pro-poor
policies, and are thus relevant to our consideration of conditionality for debt relief. At
stake is getting the right balance between adjusting the reform policies to make them
pro-poor and including targeted expenditures to benefit the poor during periods of
reform. The issue of aggregation relates to whether one concentrates on the effects for
particular groups (typically the poor) or on the economy overall (allowing that there are
winners and losers, the issue is whether the net gain is positive and whether the losers9
are compensated).7 Policies that promote economic growth are generally good for the
poor on aggregate, and are desirable for this reason. Specific groups will suffer, and
these are likely to be the relatively poor, implying a need for additional, compensatory
policies targeted at those groups (Morrissey 2000). Provided this is acknowledged, there
is nothing inconsistent with advocating broadly liberal economic policy reforms and
having a poverty reduction objective.
3.2 Debt relief and pro-poor policies
The HIPC-II scheme, agreed in 1999, is based on conditionality linking debt relief to
policies for poverty reduction. Stated briefly, countries are required to establish a good
record of implementing economic and social policy reform and prepare a PRSP
indicating how they will tackle poverty reduction. In the terminology above, PRSPs
include pro-poor complementary policies and compensatory expenditures. However, it
is the record on implementing broad economic reform, not the PRSP or pro-poor
policies, that determines eligibility for HIPC relief, the timing of the decision point and
the triggers for reaching completion.8 The funds made available by debt relief would be
then channelled into poverty-reduction, typically through a poverty action fund (PAF)
that identifies pro-poor expenditures. Thus, there is incoherence insofar as the pro-poor
element of the package does not ‘kick in’ until after compliance with liberal economic
reforms (this is discussed again in Section 4). A number of observations are in order
with respect to this process.
- As with HIPC-I, to qualify for debt relief countries must demonstrate their ability for
sound economic management through satisfactory compliance with and
implementation of policy reforms over three years under IMF and World Bank
programmes. This is the condition on which selectivity is based. Yet ‘satisfactory
compliance’ inevitably implies judgement, and even governments trying to comply
may find themselves thrown off course by external shocks (such as the increasingly
frequent and calamitous weather shocks). The inherent problem with selective
conditionality is that it is the donors, specifically the international financial
institutions (IFIs, the World Bank and IMF), that both stipulate conditions and judge
compliance and their criteria are not transparent.
- Unlike HIPC-I, to qualify under HIPC-II countries must also draw-up a poverty
reduction strategy paper (this is where pro-poor policy enters). The PRSP process
should include consultation with civil society and other interested parties. While
commendable prima facie, involving affected parties in the design of poverty-
7 Non-economists often criticize economists for considering only the aggregate effect, whether the net
effect is likely to be positive. In fact, welfare economics places strong emphasis on distribution—a
change is only welfare-improving if the net effect is positive and nobody is made worse off (i.e. the
gainers compensate the losers). This of course does not require that the poor become non-poor, rather
that the non-poor do not become poor (or that nobody becomes poorer). However, welfare criteria can
easily be made pro-poor simply be attaching a greater weight to the welfare of the poor (and this is
what the critics are in effect doing).
8 An established record of implementing policy reform over three years is the requirement to reach the
decision point, at which point a commitment for debt relief is made. The completion point is deemed
to be reached after a further period of sustained reform, often interpreted as three years, and then relief
is actually granted. In effect, credit is given for previous reform so that a country can qualify for relief
within three years.10
reduction strategies, this is a highly demanding condition. On the one hand, as
elaborated above, there is no consensus on what actually constitutes a ‘pro-poor
growth strategy’ while the impact of economic policies on poverty is not well
understood. On the other hand, ‘consultation with civil society’ is a politically
sensitive topic.
- The Fund and Bank must endorse and assess the PRSP. They will then agree with the
government a policy reform and macroeconomic management programme to be
followed during the HIPC period. Consequently, there will be some degree of cross-
conditionality (Killick 2000). The poorest countries, almost by definition countries
with weak policy-making and implementation capacity, are being required to design
and implement a sophisticated programme of linked policies. This is likely to stretch
political capacity and may undermine commitment.
- Performance criteria, monitoring and review will be applied regularly and relief will
be disbursed in tranches. The timetable will depend on how well the government
complies with the PRSP and policy programmes agreed. Upon completion, which
requires implementation of the PRSP for at least a year, debt relief is provided
without conditions. The inherent defect with this approach is that the resources to
fund pro-poor expenditures are not released fully until the end of the process. The
problems experienced with conditional lending in the past remain. The effectiveness
of HIPC-II will depend on the time-frame and severity with which implementation is
evaluated.
A major criticism of HIPC-I was its excessive reliance on conditionality (Killick 2000).
Campaigners for debt relief have argued that conditionality can be used by donors to
avoid granting the promised relief. If the conditions for macroeconomic stability and
policy reform are demanding, it will be difficult for debtor countries to qualify for relief.
Furthermore, the debt burden itself may be one reason why the debtor has difficulty
meeting the conditions. HIPC-II, in requiring a PRSP to be drawn-up by the country that
meets Fund/Bank requirements may make eligibility more difficult to achieve for the
poorest countries. The severity of conditionality is a major concern in any debt relief
programme. HIPC-II, by appearing to increase the conditions required, and by making
these a criterion for pre-selection, is very demanding of poor countries.
Another difficulty arises in trying to make the process pro-poor. One approach is to
make the conditions pro-poor, by adapting the types of economic policies that constitute
‘a good record of implementation’ as defined by the IFIs. An alternative approach (that
is not exclusive of the former) is to place the pro-poor policies in the PRSP. As this is in
keeping with the argument for complementary and compensatory policies above, it is
the approach discussed.
On the face of it, PRSPs are about listing the policy areas of specific concern to the poor
and providing a list of proposed actions in these areas. As such, there appears something
of a template that includes education, health, agriculture, water and security. Other areas
may be included, but these are the core. Similarly, the policy detail may differ from
country to country (although PRSPs rarely include much detail on policy actions), but
all will address these five areas. Of course, for most countries, especially HIPC ones,
these areas encompass the issues of greatest importance to the welfare of the poor,11
especially if interpreted broadly. As our interest is in general principles rather than fine
detail, discussion under these areas is appropriate.
The essential pro-poor policies in PRSPs can be considered under two headings—those
relating to the provision of and access to public services and those relating to the rural
sector, as the majority of the poorest in HIPC countries are in rural areas. The former
are mostly pro-poor expenditures while the latter are mostly pro-poor policies.
Consumption of public services is an important element of the well-being (or real
income) of the poor, usually omitted from income-based measures of poverty (Kanbur
2001). The most important services are education, especially at the primary level, health
(including nutrition) and water (sanitation and access to safe water). To maximize the
consumption of the poor, it is necessary not only that public services are delivered but
also that they are available for free (at least for the relatively poor). Charges for access
to health or education (including implicit charges, such as for school uniforms,
textbooks or drugs) bear disproportionately on the poor. Even if they do make efforts to
meet these charges, and thus secure access, this implies a severe reduction in income
available for food and other basic needs. Consequently, increased public spending on
the provision of social services is a central element of PRSPs. The abolition of charges
or the inclusion of specific targeting schemes provides the means of ensuring that such
expenditures are pro-poor.
Policies to address poverty in low-income countries must address the rural dimension,
especially the relevance of the agriculture sector that provides the livelihoods for most
rural people. ‘Seventy-five percent of the dollar-poor work and live in rural areas;
projections suggest that over 60% will continue to do so in 2005’ (IFAD 2001: 15).
Policies to address rural poverty must tackle four types of inequalities (IFAD 2001).
First, the rural poor have unequal access to physical and financial assets—distribution
of land is highly concentrated and the poor are disadvantaged in access to irrigation,
safe water, credit and productive assets. Second, the poor require access to technology
and extension services to increase productivity. Third, markets tend to discriminate
against the poor (this relates to the issue of market structure mentioned above). Fourth,
institutions, political and financial, often fail to serve the poor. PRSPs typically contain
a range of policies directed towards subsistence and small-holder farmers, intended to
support a pro-poor agriculture policy.
The role of debt relief itself is to provide increased government resources to finance
these pro-poor policies; the poverty action fund (PAF) details how savings on debt
servicing will be spent, and monitors expenditure. The conditionality associated with
debt relief under HIPC is intended to assist in two further ways. First, the record of
sound economic policies should ensure that the country has in place pro-growth
policies, including policies to reverse any bias against agriculture. Second, the PRSP
process should ensure that the needs of the poor are recognized and pro-poor policies
adopted by the government.
3.3 The policy environment for pro-poor policies
We have now identified some priorities in pro-poor policies. To see how these can be
turned into policy actions, and to identify an effective role for donors, it is useful to
place the ‘pro-poor agenda’ within the policy process discussed in Section 2. One way
of summarizing the policy environment for poverty reduction is on two dimensions.12
Political commitment can be either low, where the desire and capacity to adopt pro-poor
policies are weak, or high, where preferences and capacity are strong. Similarly,
administrative capability can be weak, such that only a few fairly simple reforms are
feasible, or strong, such that the reform programme can be more ambitious. An
advantage of this approach is that specific types of pro-poor policies can be classified
according to whether they are more demanding of political commitment or of
administrative capability, or both. This can be represented in the four quadrants of
Table 2 (following Morrissey 1999, but here applied to poverty reduction policies). An
appropriate objective in the design and sequencing of reforms is to keep the range of
reforms narrow and increase complexity as commitment and capability are expanded.
Successful implementation of even simple reforms can promote commitment and
enhance the capability for attempting more complex reforms.
If a country has neither the desire nor means to commence reform (cell I) then only
minimal reforms are likely. Countries with such an environment (e.g. where there is a
strong bias against agriculture) are unlikely to embark on a PRSP process, as that
requires commitment, so most poverty-reduction will be embodied in donor projects
(aid is used directly). Donor dialogue plays a role here to shift preferences towards
poverty reduction, and initiating the PRSP process can be a central element of such
dialogue. For a country initially in this position, shifting preferences and then
supporting political capacity are the appropriate functions for external agencies.
High commitment, or at least preferences for poverty-reduction, but low capability (cell
II) is perhaps the most common case in Africa. Governments may have adopted and
embarked on the PRSP process but administrative capability is the constraint that must
be relaxed. Aid in the form of technical assistance can be very important here. Given the
weak capability, it is inadvisable to attempt wide-ranging reform, so a sector focus is
helpful. Donor initiatives in sector-wide approaches (SWAPs) are appropriate, and our
earlier discussion suggests a focus on agriculture and social sectors (health and
education). As policy-making capacity is weak, ownership need not be emphasized (it is
commitment that really matters) and appropriate policy strategies can be offered or even
imposed.
Table 2
Policy environment for pro-poor policies
POLITICAL COMMITMENT
Low
(weak preference and capacity)
High
(strong preference and capacity)
I (minimal) II (incremental)
Weak donor dialogue sector focus (e.g. SWAPs)
donor projects technical assistance/PAF
initiate PRSP ‘imposed’ strategy
III (erratic) IV (extensive)

























targeted schemes integrated budget
dialogue ‘owned’ strategy
Note: Basic structure taken from Morrissey (1999: Table 4.3), although that relates to trade
liberalization policies.13
As so few African countries have a strong administrative system, the case of strong
capabilities but low commitment (cell III) is rare. Unfortunately, and for the same
reason, the case of strong capability and high commitment (cell IV), where extensive
reforms can be implemented successfully, is also rare. Nevertheless, cell IV is the
objective and the notion of the policy environment cautions for gradual sequenced
policies that build administrative capability and political commitment. Donors can do
much to assist in capacity building. In practice, it may be more meaningful to interpret
cell III as representing an intermediate point between a ‘minimal’ and ‘incremental’
policy environment. As preferences are shifted and administrative capability is
strengthened, political capacity becomes stronger. However, the underlying weakness in
capacity suggests that such a phase is unstable and associated with ‘erratic’ policies, as
policy reversals arise to placate strong opposition. It is because this phase is unstable
that extensive reforms are not feasible; these require the establishment of adequate
commitment and capability. Only then can one have a truly consultative PRSP process,
an integrated budget (as donors trust the ability of the recipient to monitor spending)
and, ultimately, pro-poor policies that are owned by the country.
4 Conclusions: Implications for conditionality
The basic argument of this paper is that the potential for implementing poverty
reduction policies is conditioned by the policy environment in developing countries. Of
central importance are government preferences for pro-poor policies and the political
capacity to promote a pro-poor agenda. Taken together these create commitment.
Persuasive economic arguments supported by relevant research can shape preferences
while technical and financial support can enhance political capacity. Through such
interventions donors can help to establish commitment to poverty-reduction strategies.
A poverty-reduction strategy requires increased spending in certain sectors. Developing
countries have limited capacity to reallocate spending from domestic resources to any
significant degree, and limited ability to increase revenues. Aid can here play its
traditional role of bridging a financing gap. More importantly, debt relief is important to
release resources for allocation to pro-poor expenditures.
The binding constraint to increasing pro-poor expenditures is resources, and donors can
relax this (especially as new resources obviate the early need for domestic redistribution
that can undermine reform and growth). Pro-poor policies, on the other hand, are more
difficult to design and imply redistribution. They therefore require stronger political
capacity and administrative capability. This problem is compounded by the
disagreements and limited knowledge on the effects of economic reform on the poor. If
the primary objective is poverty reduction, therefore, the prior policy is pro-poor
expenditures, and this is a feasible implementation objective (conditional on the policy
environment that prevails). Pro-poor policies, however desirable, are of secondary
priority. They are more difficult to design and achieve, and external intervention can as
easily be counter-productive as it is constructive. Pro-poor expenditures offer a first
stage in building commitment and a foundation for pro-poor policies.
What are the implications for conditionality? The obvious implication is that the current
approach to HIPC conditionality reverses these priorities. The resources for pro-poor
expenditures are only released after a record of policy reform has been demonstrated
and after the basis of a pro-poor policy is outlined. This is not necessary, and results14
from a misguided approach to conditionality. It is not that pre-selection is a misguided
principle. Rather, the implication is that eligibility for the release of resources (aid and
debt relief) should be based on pro-poor expenditure criteria. This is more simple, and
more transparent, than eligibility criteria based on a package of economic reforms that
interact in complex ways, are often contested regarding appropriateness, and can be
undermined by poor economic performance (not infrequently due to events beyond the
control of governments). Support for broader economic reform may require eligibility
criteria, but these could relate to pro-poor policies and should not be a precondition for
release of funds for pro-poor expenditures.
There are at least two reasons why conditions may be attached to debt relief. First, the
donors want to encourage policy reform in a particular direction. A distinction can be
made between pro-growth reforms intended to enhance the opportunities for economic
performance, about which there is some dispute, and specific pro-poor policies and
expenditures, about which there is less dispute. The inherent problem with current HIPC
arrangements is that the first set of conditions determines eligibility whereas the second
only come into effect once the PRSP is accepted and resources are released. This blurs
the distinction, and can delay the implementation of pro-poor policies that do not
require comprehensive economic policy reform. In particular, this approach delays the
disbursement of pro-poor expenditures. Second, conditions are criteria for monitoring
the compliance required, if aid flows are to be maintained or debt relief granted. In this
sense, conditions (by stipulating what must be done) serve an enforcement role by
triggering eligibility. This further blurs the distinction between types of reform.
It is important to note that these two ‘roles’ of conditionality may conflict. Typically,
the extent of reform the donor wants to encourage will be broader and deeper than the
minimum reform required to maintain aid flows. In other words, the level of reform
required to continue receiving aid is less than the level of reform required to be eligible
for debt relief. This conflict lies at the heart of the problems and ineffectiveness of
conditionality, as it gives rise to a signalling problem. Recipients want to signal a
commitment to reform in order to be eligible for debt relief. Whatever the level of
genuine reform they wish to implement, recipients will only see a need to meet the
minimum requirements. If the compliance conditions are set too high, even recipients
that are genuinely trying to reform may be denied relief (there are many reasons other
than intentional behaviour to explain failures in implementing reforms). Alternatively, if
the conditions are set too low, insufficient reform is encouraged. Donors do not know
how much reform a recipient really wants to implement, therefore may set the
conditions at the wrong level (White and Morrissey [1997] provide an exposition of this
argument). A general resolution to this problem is to allow the recipients to set the
target level of reform, and donors can decide whether this is acceptable. This is implicit
in the spirit of HIPC selection criteria, but is not so evident in the application.
A related problem is how compliance is assessed. In the case of aid, it is the donor who
decides the conditions and if compliance is satisfactory. A donor wishing to continue
disbursing funds faces an incentive to tolerate more non-compliance than really desired.
Consequently, levels of compliance (evaluated against the time-frame of the aid
agreement) were often low without punishment being triggered. Allowing the recipient
to in effect establish the conditions (the target level of reform) reduces the uncertainty
and makes it more credible for the donor to assess acceptable compliance. The recipient
wants to propose sufficient reforms to be acceptable to the donor, but not so much as to
run the risk of non-compliance and punishment. This incentive structure encourages15
recipients to commit to a feasible level of reform. Donors, if they accept this as the
minimum target, could still offer additional incentives for exceeding the target.
A similar line of argument can be extended to debt relief. To facilitate future fiscal and
debt sustainability, donors (who are the creditors) are justified in desiring pro-growth
reforms, hence such reforms have been the basis for eligibility. Donor emphasis on
poverty reduction lead to the addition of pro-poor policies under the PRSP in HIPC-II.
These were not part of the eligibility criteria, and thus have implicitly been subject to
softer conditionality based on performance indicators rather than the implementation
record. Pro-poor expenditures are in a sense an add-on, being activities that support
implementation of pro-poor policies. However, although the PRSP allows the debtors to
set the performance indicators for the PRSP (pro-poor policies and expenditures), the
IFIs in effect set the tighter pro-growth conditions for eligibility. Thus, tighter
conditions (with greater likelihood of unsatisfactory compliance) are applied to pro-
growth policies than apply to pro-poor policies. By implication, countries that could
implement pro-poor policies, especially expenditures, are being at least constrained, if
not prevented, from doing so by being denied eligibility. Reversing these implicit
priorities could enhance the provision and effectiveness of debt relief.
Four measures to reform HIPC conditionality to promote and support pro-poor policies
are recommended.
- Aid resources should be deployed to support pro-poor expenditures, the only
condition being the existence of an expenditure strategy, monitoring arrangements
and performance indicators.
- Debt relief should be initiated subject only to a PRSP plan being in place. This
facilitates the initiation of pro-poor policies. The minimum conditions for eligibility
should not be very tight, otherwise countries trying to reform may be unfairly
punished. Softer conditions favour genuine reformers by allowing them to signal
good intentions by exceeding the performance targets.
- Debt relief can be accelerated when an appropriate package of pro-growth policies is
in place. The developing country should be allowed to establish the level of reform
intended. The aim is to get countries moving in the right direction. In this way
conditions can support or underpin government policy.
- Conditions should be part of a negotiating incentive strategy rather than as a coercive
punishment strategy, and used to encourage rather than force policy reform.
Conditions should be consistent and policy coherent.
Has the PRSP process enhanced the capacity of aid to contribute to poverty reduction?
The answer is an unequivocal yes, but there remains considerable room for
improvement. In particular, the need to meet eligibility criteria has delayed the granting
of debt relief, hence delayed the release of funds for pro-poor expenditures. The
requirements for broader economic policy reform, under our proposals, would be
lessened and de-linked from initial debt relief. There is no necessary reason why this
would undermine the reform process in any country. In fact, front-loading support for
pro-poor policies is likely to enhance commitment to and potential for economic and
social reform.16
Policy advisors and donors, who tend to be the major proponents of poverty-reduction
strategies in developing countries, should show greater awareness of the prevailing
policy environment, and work with it rather than against it. Donors can assist the policy-
making process through providing technical assistance and aid, to support the budgetary
costs at the initial stage of moving to poverty-reduction strategies and to support
projects and sector programmes directed at helping the poor. Donors can also help to
increase administrative capability; support for technical assistance and training is the
most obvious mechanism. Technical assistance is equally important in contributing to
policy-making capabilities, also enhancing administration but perhaps at a higher level.
In both contexts, but especially the latter, it is best if the assistance is in and through,
rather than simply to, the government. Most importantly, implementing pro-poor
policies should not be held hostage to judgements regarding the broader policy reform
agenda.
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